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INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
OF THESIS

W as Descartes' doubt universal?
real?

What kind of doubt was it?

was it
The chief

aim of this thesis is to answer the first of these questions, that is, to examine the scope or extension of
Descartes' doubt.

Incidentally, it glances at some other

aspects of the doubt.

The solution given is based on a

study of the philosopher's methodological works.

These aee:

Discours de la M~thode
Meditationes de Prin~ Philosophia
Principia Philosophiae
Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii
Rgcherche-de la V~rite
In addition, the chief passages

deal~g

with doubt in the

letters of Descartes, and in the Objectianes

~

Reseonsio-r

nibus Authoris, are also cited.
Before

on~e

can understand with some degree of fullness

anything at all, one must see that thing in relation to its
milieu.

Accordingly, the

v.l,-'en~ng

cha.;.-ter of this thesis

aims to furnish the background, neces5ary to the examination
of our problem: the universality of Descartes' doubt.

This

"background" cbal'ter will be follo·wed by a ch.a.vter on terms
which includes a note on the critical problem.

Chapters

three and four will contain the evidence for and ag,.dnst
the universality of Descartes' doubt.

And since the question

of the reality of the doubt spontaneously flows out of that
of its universality, the evidence for and against the reality

of the doubt will also be briefly indicated.

This is
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followed by a word about the "metaphysical 11 quality of hhe
doubt.
The conclusion of this thesis is that Descartes' doubt
was metaphysical and real.

That it was metaphysical is

certain, as it is almost certain that it was real.

Con-

cerning the central problem under investigation, the results
of this thesis lead us to the conclusion that Descartes
was illogical and inconsistent: at times he calls his doubt
universal; at other times, and more frequently, he asserts
that it is not universal.
If reason be sought for studying the question
REASON FOR
THESIS
of the universality of Descartes' doubt, perhaps
the best reason is the importance of the man who used that
doubt as a philosophical instrument.

Descartes has oeen

in the past, and very likely will continue to be in the
future, the centre of much attention in the world of philosophy.
enemies.

He has had ardent followers and even more ardent
To him belongs the honour (or dishonour) of

fathering modern philosophy.

His followers make him "le

liberateur de la philosophie jusque lA esclave.nl

His

enemies blame him with originating practically all the evils
and "isms" which have plagued the world since his day. 2
~batever

one's attitude towards Descartes, one cannot deny

his supreme moment in the history of modern thought, and

consequently,of modern civilization.

Whether, then, Des-
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cartes is considered as one of the greatest enemies or as
one of the greatest benefactors of our modern world, surely
it is useful to seek as accurate an

under~tanding

as possible

of the doubt which played a paramount role in the scientific
and philosophical enquiries of a man of such stature.3

FOOTNOTES TO THE

I1~RODUCTION

6

1. Ma ritain, p. 40

2. ib., passim, viz., pp. 247-286. M. Maritain, for example,
charges Descartes with destroying theology, and preparing the destruction of meta1)hysics. He calls Descartes
the father of rationalism, pragruatism, naturalism,
agnosticism, mechanism, materialism, etc.
3. Cf. Veitch, Introduction, p. 11; Archives, Verneaux, p. 88.
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CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY NOTIONS.
THE

TIJilES

Liberator of the human spiritJ

That phrase in-

dicates the atlllosphere of the tiwes in which Des-

cartes lived.

His was an age of revolt against authority,l

a revolt, in the field of philosophy, inspired in 1-•art by
the fa iling condition of scholasticism.

Descartes' age,

moreover, witnessed a general confusion of minds caused by
the lack of solid philosophical
Descartes' age was one of

'"'
traditions.~

sceptici~ru.

Besides this,

This current of scep-

ticism was strong enough to launch Descartes upon his critical studies.3

It is not hard to see how, living in

such an age, Descartes would himself revolt against tradition, such as it was, and doubt all of its findings.

This

is not to say that Descartes• was a sceptical doubt.

Far

from being that, its very purpose was, as we shall see directly, to refute

sce~ticism.

Keeping in mind the wood of the times in which Descartes grew to manhood, we see how reasonable is the genesis of Descartes' method given by M. Chevalier:
Descartes nous indique nettewent les trois
etapes par lesquelles a passe la forn~tion
de son esprit. Il a dtabord etudie dans les livres;
mais ils sont trop eloignes de l'usage commun.
Puis il a etudie dans le grand livre du monde;
mais l•experience instruit, et ne dirige pas.
Enfin il s rest l'esolu A s retudier lui-m~me,
pour y chercher le fondement de certitude ••• 4
Descartes doubted all the knowledge discovered to his day;
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he doubted his own experience; and it was only in reflection
upon himself that he finally found, or at least felt,
certitude.
PURPOSE

OF DESCARTES

We have reniarked above that Descartes'
purpose in doubting was not scepticism.

It

waa quite the reverse:
••• le doute wethoa.ique de Descartes ••• est pour
ce grand raisonnable, quelque chose dtanalogue
A la !!! purgativa des mystiques, A cette tnuit
obscure de lt&~e' dont parle saint Jean de la
Croix, ~ar laquelle il faut pas~er pour parvenir
A la lumi~re eternelle du vrai.5
Descartes doubted in order to reach certitude.
Descartes himself tells us that his doubt was not
sceptical but methodical, that is, having certitude as its
goal:
••• pour toutes les opinions que i'avois receUes
jusques alors en ma creance, ie ne pouvois mieux
faire que dtentreprendre, une bonne fois, de les
en oster, affin d'y en remettre par apres, ou
d•autres meilleures, ou bien les mesrues, lors~e
ie les au:x:ois ajust~es au niueau de la raison.
Descartes' doubt was, then, a methodical doubt.
But it was more than that:
••• m~thodique. Cela ne signifie pas seulement
qu'il est applique methodiquement A toutes les
opinions, et aux fonaements m~mes de ces opinions,
ce qui concerne plut8t son universalite; mais
beaucoup plus profondement cela signlfie qu'il
est la condition de la decouverte de la verite.
Ltadjectif methodique doit ~tre pris au sens
strict: le doute est la methode m~me perme1tant
de trouver un jugeruent absolument certain.
EVOLUTION
OF lJfr."'THOD?

M. Verneaux thinks there was a gradual

evolution of Descartes' method, a transition from reflexive

9

analysis (in the Regulae), by way of.evidence (in the
Discours), to methodical doubt (in the Meditationes). 8
To us this does not seem to be the case.
that Descartes got his method all at once.

It seems more likely
It appears to

have come to hiru the night of his famous dream in the
November of 1519 •
••• ie deweurois toutle jour enferrue seul dans
un po~sle, ou i'avois tout le loysir de mtentretenir de mes pensees •·· ie me persuaday ••• que
pour toutes les opinions que i'auois recettes
jusques alors en ma creance, ie ne pouuois
mieux faire que dtentreprendre une bonne fois de
les en oster, affin dty en remettre par apres,
ou dtautres meilleures, ou bien les mesrnes ••• 9
In this passage from the Discours, Descartes tells us
that the idea of his methodical doubt had come to him,
already fully developed, in 1619.

Now the works in which

M. Verneaux traces an evolution of Descartes' method (viz.,
the Regqlae, Discours, and Meditationes) were all published
many years after 1619. Therefore there seems to have been
•
no substantial change in the method: Descartes had already
upon it, all at once, during his dream of November,
1619. 10
com~

TWO ELENili"NT S

~~ereas

Descartes' method underwent no

essential change, it consisted, as M. Verneaux aptly points
out, of two elements, analysis and doubt:
Notanda autem hie sunt duo haec: nihil nimirum
falsuru pro vero fu~ponere, et ad omnium cognitionem pervenire. 1

-
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••• et si forte, ut saepe contingat, vias omnes,
quae ad illam (rem petitam) hominibus patent,
potueriwus perlustrar€, liceat audacter asseeere,
supra omnem ingenii huwani captum positam esse
ejus coanitionem.l2
As these yassages imply, Descartes' method was not a bald
doubt.

Rather it was a cycle of analysis-doubt-analysis.

If analysis revealed anything dubitable in a matter,
Descartes doubted.

If further analysis removed all dubious

elements, he, of course, ceased doubting.
OBSCURITY

We should like to conclude this preliminary

chapter with a few words concerning the difficulty of definitely determining the nature of Descartes' doubt.

The

reason for this is Descartes' lack of clarity, and his illogicality and vacillation when he speaks of his method.
As M. Maritain points out, 13the distinguishing characteristic of Descartes' philosophy is the multitude of contradictions it contains, contradictions
no way attempted to solve.

wh~ch

Descartes in

The same ambiguity and vague-

ness which surrounas the other writings of this French
poet-philosopher also clouds his explanations of his
doubt.

As a result, even in Descartes' day there was dis-

agreement as to the kind of doubt Descartes held.

As we

shall see, the same difference of opinion prevails today.
Some of the difficulty in grasping the exact purport
of Descartes' doubt may also be due to the fact of its
gradual change.

For if there was no essential change of
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Descartes' method, there do seem to have been fluctuations
within that method.

The extension of the doubt may have

varied in the course of years.
more, now less.

Now it seems to include

In truth, by its very nature Descartes'

doubt was bound gradually to

cl~nge.

He himself says as

much:
••• et faisant particulierement reflexion, en
chasque matiere, sur ce qui la pouuoit rendre
suspecte, et nous donner occasion de nous mesprendre,
ie deracinois cependant de mon esprit toutes les
erreurs qui s 'Y estoient pft glisser au1-'aravant • .14
These words show that Descartes did not rid himself of
all his opinions at once, but that he set about this task
quite gradually, rejecting only those
. opinions whose
examination had failed to supply him with clear evidence
of their truth.

This can give some plausibility to Ver-

neauxrs opinion that Descartes' method went thru a gradual
evolution.

However we believe i t more true to say that

the method was unchanged but was applied to a broadening
field.
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FOOTNOT~S

TO CHAPTER I.

1. Veitch, Introduction, pp. 9-10
2 • i b • , I». 11

3. Marechal, p. 37
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5. ib., p. 212

6. AT, 6.13

7. Archives, Verneaux, pp. 25-26
8. ib., pp. 18-24
9. AT, 6.11-13

10. This point is disputed. Some say that during his famous
"songen Descartes discovered his analytcal geqmetry,
and not his methodical doubt.
11. AT, 1o.e12
12. AT, 10.389
13. Maritain, pp. 54-59

14. AT, 6.28
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CHAPTER II.
DEFINITION OF TERMS.
The general background of Descartes' doubt has been
sketched in the preceding chapter.

Before taking up the

study proper of the doubt, it is necessary to define the
chief terms which will recur again and again on almost every
page of this thesis.

These terms are concerned with the

two states of the mind known as doubt and certitude.
STATES
OF MIND

The understanding of the various kinds of doubt
and certitude, as these words are used in the

following pages, will be aidea by briefly outlining the
chief states of the mind.

Thus it will appear what sort

of mental state the present writer conceives doubt in general
and certitude in general to be.
There are, then, five states of the mind: ignorance,
doubt, suspicion, opinion, and certitude.

This division

has for its basis that complex act of the mind
a judgment.

kno~n

as

In the first three states, ignorance, doubt,

and suspicion, there is

~

act of judgment, that is, there

is no assent of the mind, actual or implicit, to the knoWB
objective identity or diversity of two ideas.

In opinion,

the mind does assent, but its assent is uncertain, the
motives calling for assent are mere suasive or probable
motives.

In certitude, the mind grants its assent, and its

certain assent, because the motives inclining it to assent

14

are certain motives.l
A more precise definition of doubt and certitude is
now in place.

Doubt is a "suspension of the mind (assent)

between both parts of a contradiction."

In the state of

doubt, the mind is afraid that it may be in error.

Certi-

tude may be defined as "the firm adhesion of the mind to
one part of a contradiction, without any fear of error.n2
In other words, in the state of doubt and in that of
certitude the mind wants to pass a judgment on some object.
But in the state of doubt the mind either does not see that
object clearly enough, or for the moment turns itself away
from that object.

That is the reason why a doubting mind

hesitates to pass judgment on an object.
true in the state of certitude.

The reverse is

Here too the mind wishes

to make a judgment concerning an object.

A nd here the

object appears so clearly to the mind that it cannot but
judge correctly of that object.
KIND S
OF DOUBT
classes.

Next, may be given the various kinds or divisions of doubt.

Doubt can be divided into three

If one looks at the reason for the suspension of

assent, doubt is called positive doubt, when the "suspension
is the result of an a~parent equality of mot~ves.n3

It

is called negative doubt, when the nsuspension is the result
of lack of motives."

If one considers the way in which llhe

doubt takes place, it is called either real doubt or
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fictitious doubt.

A real doubt is had when the mind truly

assents to some truth, but acts as though it were suspending
its assent.

If one focuses ones attention on the end for

which one doubts, the doubt may be either methodical or
sceptica 1.

A methodical doubt is "any suspension which

is used according to a definite plan in order to acquire
knowledge."

In other words a doubt is methodical when it

is used as a means to

~be

finding of truth.

A sceptical

doubt, on the other hand, is a doubt "which is cherished
as a definite state of mind with a view to the possession
or retention of truth."

For eX&lll_ple, I have a definite

and certain view about something; this causes me to regard every other view with the eye of a sceptic.

Or it

may be that my view is not certain; but I do not wish to
change it, as this might involve a change in my life, my
attitude towards things: I employ scepticism towards all
views different from

my

own, as a defense against sur-

rendering my view.
ABSTRACTION
tion."

A word may be inserted here about "abstrac-

This state of mind is often called a doubt; but

to call "abstraction" a doubt is to misunderstand the
meaning of the word.

"Abstraction" refers to one of the

various methods used in solving the critical problem, the
problem of the validity of human cognition.

The philo-

sopher who thus "abstracts" retains all the certitudes,
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natural and philosophical, which he possesses at the time.
The point to note here is that thus nto abstract" is not
in any way, not even fictitiously, to doubt.

This same

method of abstraction is sometimes expressed in the formula
employed by St.

Au~stine:

QUaerendum est quasi omnia essent incerta.5
"Abstraction," then, is a
ad inquirendum eodem

11

determinatio voluntatis parata.e

~ ~

inquirit realiter dubttans de

objecto particulari, verbi gratia, de immortalitate animae ••• n6
KINDS OF
CERTITUDE

We may now briefly enumerate the chief divisions of certitude.

may be explicit or implicit.

By

To begin with, certitudes
means of an explicit cer-

titude I know a thing "in actu signato;" in such a certitude there is direct 8.!ld expli·ci t a:·ttention of the mind to
the thing which is known as true.
be implicit.

But certitudes may also

Indeed, in every explicit certitude are con-

tained other implicit certitudes, chief among which is the
cognition of my mind's aptituue for truth.

By an implicit

certitude I know a thing "in actu exercito;" in such a
certitude the mind does not directly nor in the first place,
but only secondarily, attend to the truth known in that
implicit certitude.7
Certitude is also divided into purely subjective certitude ru1d objective certitude.

Purely subjective certi-
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tude is no certitude at all; for it merely signifies "ipse
assensus firmus sine formidine errandi."

This assent,

however, is not elicited by certain motives; and for this
reason purely subjective certitude often proves erroneous.
Objective, or formal, legitimate, real, perfect, absolute
certitude, is
••• assensus firmus in veritatem ex ruotvo infallibili (excludente possibilitatem erroris) • • •
clara cognitio, sive exercite sive signate,
(adest) huius infallibilitatis ••• 8
Now follows a very important division of certitude.
Certitude may be metaphysical, physical, or moral.

This

division o·f certitude corresponds to a like division of
universality, necessity, possibility, impossibility, repugnance.

To understand this division of certitude, it

will be helpful first briefly to define the various kinds
of necessity, metayhysical, physical, and moral.

The

definitions are taken from Father Frick:
Metaphysice necessarium est quod in ipsis rerum
ideis seu essentiis fundatur ita, ut ne per
divinam quidem omnipotentiam aliter esse seu
fieri possit •••
Physice necessarium ••• est quod in rerum
natura ita fundatur ut per solam Dei onmipotentiam aliter esse seu fieri possit •••
Moraliter necessarium ••• est, quod ita nititur
in constantibus rationalis naturae aoribu~,
inclinationibus, ut contradictorium, licet
physice possibile sit seu physicas hominis
vires non excedat, tamen propter oppositionem
vel incongruitatem cum natura rationali non
fiat. 9
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Using "necessity" as a basis, Father Frick gives the
following concise definitions of the various kinds of objective certitude, metaphysical, physical, and moral:
Necessitas haec (ruetaphysica) objectiva alicui
menti manifesta est certitudo metaphysica
objectiva.
Necessitas physica objectiva alicui menti manifesta e~t certitudo ppysica objectiva.
Necessitas moralis objectiva alicui menti manifesta est certitudo moralis objectiva.lO
Metaphysical certitude is absolute certitude; physical
and moral certitude constitute hypothetical certitude.
But hypothetical certitude is no les::; truly certitude
than is absolute certitude.

Both fulfil all the require-

ments of true and perfect certitude.

A NOTE ON THE CRITICAL PROBLEM.
Descartes' doubt takes much of its importance from
the fact that it played so imyortant a role at the birth
of the critical problem, the core problem, today, of that
branch of philosophy known variously as .Major Logic, Critica,
or the Theory of Cognition.

To solve this central cri-

tical problem, Descartes employed his doubt.
Accordingly, to see the bearing and significance of
Descartes' doubt in clearer perspective, it is necessary
briefly to describe the nature of the critical problem and
to outline the chief methods used in solving that problem.
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Thus it will be easier to see the position of Descartes'
doubt in the history of the science of Critica.
DEFINITION

~bat,

then, is the critical problem?

In

a larger sense, the term is used to include the threefold
problem of scepticism, relativism and idealism.

In a

stricter sense, however, the critical problem is concerned
only with the sceptical problem.

Taken in this stricter

sense, the critical problem deals with an inquiry into the
mind's aptitude for truth and certitude.

ttis the human

mind apt for true and certain knowledge?",-- this question
may be called

~

critical problem.

VARIOUS
SOLUTIONS

Many ways have been proposed of solving this
pro.blem of the illind' s aptitude for truth.

These

various solutions may be classified into those that deny
the mind's aptness for truth, and those that affirm it.
The denial of the mind's aptitude is the solution of the
sceptic.

Those who affirm the validity of human knowledge

fall into those who claim that there is no possible way
of showing or proving

this validity; and those who say

we can prove the validity of human knowledge.

To the

first class belong the exaggerated dogmatists, for example
the fideists and voluntarists.
Those who assert that the objectivity of human knowledge can be demonstrated, again separate into those who
employ some sort of doubt to arrive at this demonstration

,........
~----------------------------------------------------------~
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and those who employ other methods.
Descartes, who is generally considered the first in
modern times seriously to have examined the critical problem, belongs to those who employ a doubt.
was, it is said, a real, positive doubt.

Descartes' doubt
A positive doubt

is one in which the "ratio suspensionis est propter apparentem aequalitatem motivorum."

A

negative doubt, on the

other hand, is one in which the "ratio suspensionis est
defectus motivorum."
offered by Sentroul,
Marechal,

s.

s.

J.

A real negative doubt was the solution
Jeanni~re,

s.

J., Picard,

Cardinal Mercier, Donat,

s.

s.

J., and

J., and Geny,

J., held a fictitious doubt to be the correct solution.
In greatest favor today are those who claim to demon-

strate the validity of the mind by other methods than
doubt.

The chief names in this class are Bonnet,

s.

J.,

(who employs "abstraction"), Naber, S. J. (who employs
nreflexion"), and a group including Mattiusi,
Tonquedec,

s.

J., Maritain, Boyer,

s.

s.

J., De

J., Calcagno,

s.

J.,

who, to use the words of one of them, solve the mind's
aptitude by a
formalis perceptio aptitudinis no~ in actu
signato, sed in actu exercito. 10
It is well to note that the word "demonstrate," as applied
to this last group, does not refer to a strict, syllogistic
demonstration..

This obviously would involve a "petitio

21

principii."

But "demonstrare aptitudinem mentis" here

rather means "wonstrare 11 : !Q

~

the mind's reliability

bY seeing that reliability in the act of reflection.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTBR II.
1. Frick, pp. 38 ff.; pp. 128-130

n. For a lengthier discussion of the
nature of certitude, the reader way consult Frick, pp.
130 ff.

2. ib., pp. 128-130.

3. st. Thomas, 14.1. "Motive," as it is used in this discussion, is merely a synonym for "object," which appears
to the mind more or less clearly, or with equal clarity
from several aspects.
4. Naber, p. 98
5. St. Augustine, Lib. 2, c. 3

6. Bonnet, pp. 28-30
7. Frick, p. 109; Boyer, pp. 175-176
8. ib., pp. 130-132
9. ib., pp. 139-140

10. For a further discussion of the various solutions of
the critical problem, consult Bonnet's Critica, pp.
22-78; Naber's Theoria Co~itionis Critica, pp. 93-109;
and Marecha.l's Point duD part~.!§: M~tap:hysigue, vol.
5, pp. 38-53.
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CHAPTER III
ARGUMENTS FOR A UNIVERSAL DOUBT.
We are now ready to take up our problem proper.

In

the present chavter we give the reasons which have led many
to the conclusion that Descartes' doubt was universal.
If we read through Descartes' works, we

DESCARIDES'
TESTIMONY

shall find a good many statements which argue

the universality of his doubt.

For example, in the Discours,

he says,
••• commenqant des lors a ne conter pour rien
les mienes propres (opinions), a cause que1 ie
les voulmis remettre toutes a l'examen •••
(Yet, a closer examination of that very passage shows that
Descartes is certain that he has four maxims of morality
which may guide him during his doubt.

More about these

later.)
In the Meditationes we discover another seeming proof
of a universal doubt:
In prima (Meditatione), causae exponuntur propter
quas de rebus omnibus~ praesertim materialibus,
possumus dubitare •••
Simila r in tone are these words, occurring a few pages
further on:
Animadverti jam ante aliquot annos quam multa,
ineunte aetate, falsa pro veris admiserim, et quam
dubia sint quaecumque istis postea superextruxi,
ac proinde funditus omnia semel in vita esse evertenda atque a primis fundamentis denuo inchoandum • • •
opportune igitur hodie mentem curis omnibus
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exsolvi, securum mihi otium procuravi, solus
secedo, serio tandem et libere generali huic
mearum o~inionum eversioni vacabo.3
The "universal" doubt seems to have extended at least
to all sense knowledge:
Cernis equidem, de Olliilibus rebus quarum cognitio
non nisi ope sensuum ad te pervenit, cum ratione
dubitare te posse ••• 4
But here Descartes' doubt was only an
doubt.

ap~rent

and illusory

For the validity of sense perception is a self-

evident truth, that is, one which we cannot in actual fact
doubt.

In view of this, we should already have to say that

Descartes' doubt was at most apparently universal, an
illusory universal doubt.
But let us suppose for a moment that the doubt was
truly universal; immediately we shall have to qualify the
adjective "universal."

Certainly Descartes did not start

out by at once doubting every one of his certitudes with
a separate, individual doubt.

As we have seen, he set about

gradually to rid himself of all dubious opinions.

But, as

he himself says, when he came to the opinion "I think,"
it was impossible for him to doubt his existence.

So that

!e never doubted at least the one truth of his own existence.

If, then, one insists on calling Descartes' doubt

universal, one can call it a universal doubt only in the
sense that Descartes set out to examine

~

of his opinions.

In this view universal would mean not that all the opinions
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were considered doubtful, but that they were all

~ubjected

to analysis, in order to discover those particular truths
of which a metaphysical doubt could not be had.
Thus far we have seen only what Descartes

TESTIMOh'Y
OF OTHERS

himself says about the universality of his doubt.

There are some authors who hold that the doubt was in fact
universal.

We quote the statements of two writers who

cling to this opinion, M. Verneaux and .Mr. Sewall.

The

former says:
Le doute est universal ••• tel que Descartes le
presente en maint passage, il est clair que rien
n'est except~ de cette "abdication.n5
Sewall writes:
Vfuat has given Descartes a unique hold upon the
thought of modern times is his making the mind's
position of universal dgubt the proper starting
place in philosophy •••
AN INST-ANT?

Let us grant that the authors who claim

that Descartes' doubt was universal are right.

How long,

in that case, did Descartes' universal doubt last?

Des-

cartes himself answers this question:
••• ie me resolu ae feindre que toutes les
chases qui m'estoient iamais entrees en l'esprit,
n'estoient non plus vrayes que les illusions de
mes songes. Mais, aussitost apres, ie pris garde
que, pend~it que ie voulois ainsi penser que
tout estoit .faux, 11 .falloit necessairement que
moi, qui le pensois, .fusse quelque chose. Et
remarquant que cete verite: ie pense, done ~ ~~
estoit si ferme et si assur69; que toutes les
plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques
ntestoient pas capables de l'esbransler ••• 7
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If Descartes' doubt was truly universal, that universal
doubt -- even in the manner in which we have just qualified
the word "universal" -- lasted but an instant.
By way of comment on these arguments

AN ABSTRACTION?

for the universality of Descartes' doubt, we venture the
theory that Descartes' "universal" doubt was more of an
"abstraction" than a doubt.

This view seems to be supported

by one of the most famous passages in Descartes' works:
Utar hie exemplo valde familiari, ad facti mei
rationem ipsi ex9licandam ••• Si forte haberet
corbem pomis pler~m, et vereretur ne aliqua ex
pomis istis essent putrida, v~lletque ipsa auferre,
ne reliqua corrumperent, quo pacto id faceret?
An non in primis omnia omnino ex corbe rejiceret?
ac deinde singula ordine perlustrans, ea sola,
quae agnosceret non esse corrupta, resumeret,
atque in corbem reponeret, aliis relictis.8
The application is, of course, that in a similar way a
man exaruines all his judgments in order to reject the false
and retain the true.

Surely, no man who has a basket of

apples, fears that they are all bad.
says that a man may suspect

"~"

Descartes himself

of the fruit is spoilt,

that is, he may suspect or know that some of the apples
are really bad.

But what does he do?

the apples, good and bad alike.

He examines all of

He does this, not because

he fears that all are spoilt -- in that case he would not
examine the fruit to find out which was spoilt, but rather
to find out which was sound.

The reason, then, for the

examination is to find out which of the apples are spoilt.

~--------------------------------------~
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Of course, the man examines all the apples, one by one.
He looks over the good apples as if they might be spoilt
too.

In this sense, he treats all the apples alike.

Yet

not for a moment does he really think all of the apples
might be bad.

In like manner, Descartes did not for a

moment really think that all his juugruents were uncertain.
But like the man with the basket of fruit, he was afraid
some of his judgments might be bad, in this case, uncertain.
To find out which were the uncertain judgments, Descartes
proceeded to examine all of his judgments, one by one,
good as well as bad.
all of his judgments

For a moment. he acted in regard to
~

though they might be false; but

not even for a moment did he think that they
uncertain.

~

all

This, at any rate, appears to be a likely

explanation of his "universal" doubt.

In so far as the

doubt was "universal," it was not a doubt at all, but an
abstraction, in the sense in which we have explained that
term in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER IV
ARGUlimNTS FOR A NON-UNIVERSAL DOUBT.
If there are quite a few statements in Descartes'
works that seem to bespeak a

Ul~iversal

doubt, there are

equally as many, indeed, there are far more numerous passages
in Descartes which argue a non-universal doubt.

We may

begin this chapter by selecting from Descartes' writings
some more or less general affirmations of the non-universality of his doubt.

DESCARTES'
TESTIMONY

In the Regulae Descartes implicitly denies
the possibility of an universal doubt:
••• si Socrates dicit se dubitare de omnibus,
hinc necessario sequitur: ergo hoc saltem intelligit, quod dubitat; item, ergo cognoscit aliquid
posse esse verum vel falsum, etc., ista enim
naturae dubitationis necessario annexa sunt. 1

In the Discours he says he aimed to reject (doubt)
only unreasonad opinions:
••• ie ne voulu point commencer a reietter tout
a fait aucune des opinions, qui stestoient pd
glisser autrefois en ma creance sa:z.s y auoir
este introduites par la raison •••
A few pages further on in the Discours, Descartes lays a
similar restriction on his doubt.

He says that the doubt

takes in only those opinions which can be suspected of not
being entirely certain •
••• ie pensay qu'il faloit que ie fisse tout
le contraire, et que ie reiettasse, comme absolument faux, tout ce en qugy ie pourrois imaginer le woindre doute •••
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In the Meditationes we are again told that the doubt
extends only to matters which contain some dubitable element:
••• jam ratio persuadet, non minus accurate ab
iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubita.ta,
quam ab falsis assensionem esse cohibendam ••• 4
On another page we find this certitude:
••• si hoc ejus (Dei) bonitati repugnaret, talem
me creasse ut semper fallar, ab eadem eti~m videretur esse alienum permittere ut interdum fallar;
quod ultimum taman non potest dici.5
If Descartes has only this one certitude, he obviously does
not doubt all

thing~.

In the RechercLe, simultaneously with the declaration
of his universal

dot~.bt,

Descartes tells us of yet another

csrt1tude he possesses:
••• adactum me videam ad confitendum, nihil cum
aliqua certitudine me scire, sed de omnibus
dubitare, et in nulLa re certum asse.6
In the same little essay, Descartes limits his doubt to
inexact knowledge:
••• 11 faudroit aussy que chaque homme ••• se
resolust une bonne fois d'oster de sa fantaisie
tuutes les idee7 iwparfaites qui y ont este tracees
iusqu'alors •••
The Objectiones £Bm Responsionibus provide us with a
rather insistently repeated denial of the possibility of
a universal cioubt.

Ex his autem (quae clare ab intellectu percipiuntur)
quaedam sunt tam perspicua, simulque tam

simplici~,
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ut numquaw possimus de iis cogitare, quin vera
esse credanus: ut quod ego, dum cogito, existam;
quod ea quae semel facta sunt, infecta esse non
possint, et talia, de quibus manifestum est bane
certitudinem haberi. Non possumus enim de iis
dubitare, nisi de ipsis cogitemus; sed non possumus de iisdem cogitare, quin simul credamus
vera esse, ut assumptum est; ergo non possumus
de iis dubitare, quin siwul credamus vera esse,
hoc est, non possuwus unquam dubitare.B
In the Principia we again see that Descartes' doubt
was not universal.

For example, in tl1is passage, we find

Descartes asserting the certain fact of free will:
Libertatem arbitrii esse per se notam: Quod autem
sit in nostra voluntate libertas, et rnultis ,ad
arbitrium vel assentiti vel non assentiri possimus,
adeo manifestum est, ut inter prima.s et maxime
collllllunes notiones, quae nobis sunt innatae, sit
recensendum. Patuitque maxime paulo ante, cum
de omnibus dubitare stu<ientes, eo usque su><JUS
progress!, ut fingeremus aliquem potantissimum
nostrae originis authorem modis omnibus nos
fallere conari; nihilominus enim hance in nobis
libertatem esse experieaarnur, ut possemus ab iis
credendis abstinere, quae non plane cert<il. erant
et explorata. Nee ulla magi• per se nota et
perspecta esse possunt, quam quae tunc temporis
non dubia videbantur.9
In another part of the Principia Descartes can once again
be heard denying the universality of his doubt:
Praeter caetera autem, meruoriae nostrae pro
summa regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis a
Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissirna credenda.lO
In the Principia, too, Descartes tells us what he
means when he uses the expression "we must doubt all things."
"All" is not as universal as we might think.

This is

proved by the wording and explanation of the first two
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principles:
I. Veritatem inquirenti, semel in vita de onmibus,
quantum fieri votest, esse dubitandum.ll
Follows the explanation of principle one:
••• de iis omnibus studeamus dubitare, in quibus
vel minimam incertitudinis suspicionem reperiewus.
From this is is clear that we are to doubt only those things
about which a doubt is possible, only those that are not
certain.
In the explanation of principle two, also, we are
told that all things does not nave a universal extension:
Quin et ~ etiam, de guibus dubitabimus, utile
erit habere pro falsis, ut tanto clarius, quidnam
certii2imum et cognitu facillimum sit, inveniamus.
Surely the "illa." implies that we will by no means doubt
everything, that we have some opinions which are indubitable.
Lastly, there is among the annotations to the Principia
a statement in which we are explicitly told that we must
not include all things in our uoubt.

The doubt is to be

employed only when we have good reasons for using it.
The writer tells us that there are cases where such
reasons do not exist:

CWD habetur positiva ratio quae aliquid persuadet,
non esse metaphysicas illas dubitationes in
contra.rium adnJittendas, quae nulla prorsus ratione
fultae ponuntur: ut an forte Deus voluerit
mentem annihilare, quoties destruitur ejus
corpus .13
TESTIMONY
OF OTHERS

Enough for what Descartes more or less
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directly tells us about the non-universality of his uoubt.
We shall now glance at a few opinions that others hold concerning this same point.

One of the best known stuuents

of Descartes of our day, M. Chevalier, holds the non-universality of the doubt:
Ce doute, d'abord n'est pas un doute universal •••
Descartes commence par soustraire au doute la
pratique et ses principes.l4
Keeling, a leading English writer on Descartes, voices a
similar view:
He (Descartes) is going to test all manner of
common beliefs ••• all in f~ct except those
concerning morals and religion ••• methodical
doubt is thus the general decision to aoubt 'on
principle' any particular belief or class of
beliefs that can be ...;;;;;;.;;;,.;;;;.:;;...;..:,.;;;;;;
doubted.l5

___

Veitch, who above asserted the universality of the doubt,
implicitly agrees with Chevalier and Keeling:
Descartes was led to seek for an ultimate ground
of certitude ••• in what commended itself to him
as self-verifying and tnerefore ultimate 1n
knowledge -- in other words, a limit to doubt,
a criterion of certainty ••• 16
From the quotations here given, it seems very likely
that Descartes' doubt was not universal.

Indeed the whole

point of doubting with Descartes was to get to something
which he would be unable to doubt, so as to make this indubitable thing the basis of his philosophy.

Moreover, the

conclusion that Descartes' doubt w&s not universal is richly
supported by the countless individual explicit and implicit
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certitudes contained in those very pages of Descartes where
he explains his doubt.

We shall now take up, first, some

of these explicit certitudes; then we shall look at some
of the implicit certitudes.
DESCARTES'
EXPLICIT
CERTITUDES

Among the various explicit certitudes which
accompany Descartes' explanations of his doubt,

we discover, to begin with, that Descartes seerus to have
had nJany certitudes about non-existing things (his doubt
was chiefly concerned with

th~gs

that existed):

Atque ubi dixi hanc propositionem, ego cogito,
ergo sum, esse omnium primam et certissimam,
quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat,
non ideo negavi quin ante ipsam scire oporteat,
guid sit cogitatio, quid existentia, quid certitude;
item, guod fieri !!Q!! possit, ut id quod. cogitet
B2ll existat, et talia; sed quia hae sunt simplicissimae notiones, et· quae solae nullius rei
existentis notiti~ praebent, idcirco non censui
esse numerandas.i
Descartes never denied the certitude of dozens of truths
which did not involve existence.
In the Discours, in the very breath in which Descartes
says he must aoubt, he tells us of several particular certitudes he possesses.

I select one:

••• il nty a eu que les seuls Mathematicians
qui ont pft trouuer quelques demonstrations,
c'est a dire ~uelques raisons certaines et
evidentes ••• ra
This brings us to a very interesting class of certitudes concerning knowledge or certitude itself.
Regulae are full of these certitudes.

The

In Rule VII, for
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example, Descartes is sure that there is such a thing as
certitude:
Eorum, quae hie proponuntur, observatio necessaria
est ad illas veritates inter cert&s admittendas
••• solius enumerationis auxilio fieri potest,
ut ad quamcuruque (questionem) animam applicemus,
de illa semper fer.a.mus iudicium verum et certuru ••• 19
••• si tamen vel minimum quid omittamus, catena
~~a~~
20 st, et tota conclusionis labitur certiIn Rule IX we find that Descartes is sure of the existence
of knowledge and truth:
••• atqui notandum est illos, qui vere sciunt •••
facilitate dignoscere veritatem ••• 21
Descartes is certain, moreover, about the existence
of and distinction between truth and falsity.

On the very

first page of the Regulae, Descartes assures us of the
existence of science, that is, truth:
Nam cum scientiae onmes nihil aliud sint quam
humana sa~~entia, quae semper una et eadem
manet •••
And, as we have already seen, Descartes is sure that the
ancients reached truth:
••• eoaem mentis lumine • • • Philoso1,hiae etiam
et Matheseos veras ideas agnoverint ••• 23
Again, Descartes tells us that we should go about our
search for truth, separating truth from falsity:
••• qualis de qualibet re cogni~io vera esse
possit aut falsa, distinguatis.~4
Having already received this piece of advice from Descartes,

r
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we are not surprised to hear, a moment later:
Intelligimus autem per qu:aestionem, illa,.,omnia.
in quibus reperitur verUlll vel falsurn ••• ~5
Further on in the Regulae, Descartes has certitude
that there are what he calls "purely intellectual" (pure
intellectuales) objects of knowledge. 26 He is sure, too,
of the existence of "simple natures" and of their selfevidence.27

He is also certain that some people

may

err:

••• evidens est nos falli, si quando aliquam
ex naturis istis simplicibus a nobis totam
non cognosci judicemus ••• 28
Closely related to these certitudes about the existence of knowledge, true

ana

other people have certitude.

false, is the certitude that
That Descartes was

ce~tain

of this already appears in- some of the quo-tations just
cited.

Here we give a few more statements on this

~oint:

••• quoties aliquid certum et evidens feliciter
invenerunt (scriptores), nur1quam exhibent nisi
variis ambagibus involutum ••• 29
••• eodem mentis lumine, quo virtutem volupta.ti,
honestumque utili praeferendum esse videbant
(veteres), etsi, quare hoc ita esset, ignorarent, Philosophiae e~e,ani et Matheseos veras
ideas agnoverunt •••
Since Descartes was certain of the possibility and
existence of knowledge, one would naturally also expect
him to be-certain about the existence of faculties of
knowledge.

And so it is:
In nobis quattuor sunt facultates tantum qu~~us
ad hoc (rerum cognitionem) uti possimus •••
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However,the doubting Descartes goes far beyond the
assurance that we have four faculties.

He possesses cer-

titude regarding the trustworthiness of these faculties:
of his ideas, intuitions, his reasoning, his memory, his
senses.

In a

~ord,

he has no doubt about the aptitude of

the mind for truth.
It is useful to examine separately Descartes• certitude about each of the faculties we have mentioned.
First, there are ideas.

Does Descartes doubt them?

We have hinted that Descartes excluded from the scope of
his doubt self-evident, indubitable judgments.

From this

it .follows that he cherished no doubt about ide.as; for
judgments are made of ideas.

Chevalier confirms this

view:
Le doute m~thodique s•~tend done' tous les
jugements, mais non pas aux id~es en tant qu'i-

d~es.6~
P~re

LeBlond offers us further testimony of this exclusion

from the doubt, of ideas:
••• certes Descartes ne doute nullement que les
choses ne r~pondent aux id~es ••• 33
Just as Descartes is certain of the validity of his
ideas, so too is he certain of the validity of his intuitions:
••• hie recensentur omnes intellectus nostri
actiones per quas ad rerum cognitionem absque
ullo. deceptionis metu possimus ~ervenire:
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admittunturque tantum duae, intuitus scilicet
et inductio.34
The san1e thought occurs in this passage:
Postquam aliquot propositiones simplices sumus
intuiti ••• ad mentis intuitum duo requirimus:
nempe ut prop~~itio clare et distincte •••
intelligatur.u5
M. Chevalier likewise believes that Descartes did not
doubt the certitude of his intuitions:
Ce contact de son esprit avec la source de toute
verite, qui constitue son intuition premi~re •••
La connaissance intuitive est Ulle ••• connaissance premi~re, gratuite, certaine ••• 36
In his Descartes, Chevalier ae;ain expresses the same
opinion:
••• pensee, certitude, existence, et que pour
penser il faut ~tre (which is an intuitive
judgment), et autres chases semblables ne
auraient ~tre mises ici en compte (that is,
cannot be included within the scope of the
doubt) ••• 37
Certain of the objectivity of his ideas and intuitions,
Descartes also seems not to doubt the validity of his
reasoning faculty.

Thus in the Regulae we find many state-

ments of Descartes' certitude on this point.

Here are

some exrunples:
NotandUili insuper, experientias rerum saepe esse
f.allaces, deductionem vero, sive illationem
puram unius ab altero ••• numquam male fieri ab
intellectu vel minima rationali ••• hie recensentur omnes intellectus nostri actiones, per
quas*rerum cognitionem absque ullo deceptionis
metu possimus pervenire: admittunturgue tantum
duae, intuitus scilicet et inductio.38
*ad
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Eorum quae hie proponuntur observatio necessaria
est ad illas veritates inter certas admittendas,
quas supra diximus a primis et per se notis
principiis non immediate deduci.39
For other proofs that Descartes was certain of the validity
of deduction, the reader is referred to AT, 10.390, 400,
411, 444.

Concerning the memory, we find an indication that
Descartes was certain about the workings of this faculty
also, for he says of it:
••• memoria, a qua pendere dictum est certitudinem
conclusionum, quae plura complectuntur quam
uno intuitu capere possimus ••• 40
Finally, i t seems that Descartes was even certain,
at bottom, about the validity of his senses.

As proof of

this may be cited these passages:
Dicimus sexto, naturas illas, quas compositas
appellamus, a nobis cognosci ••• quia experimur
quales sint ••• Experiruur quiquid sensu percipimus, quidquid ex aliis auciimus, et generaliter quaecumque ad intellectum nostrum, vel
aliunde perveniunt, vel ex sui ipsius contemplatione reflexa. Ubi notandum est, intellectum
a nullo umquam experimento decipi posse, si
praecise tantum intueatur rem sibi objectam ••• 41
Nemo enim tam hebeti ingenio est, qui non percipiat se, dum sedet, aliquo modo uifferre a
se ipso, dum pedibus insistit ••• 42
Quis autem unquam dubitavit (certainly Descartes
never did), quin corpora moveantur, variasque
habeant magnitudines et figuras ••• 43
From these excerpts it would seem that though Descartes
often asserted the need of doubting all sense knowledge,
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he did not, in fact, doubt the trustworthiness of his senses.
What conclusion is one to draw from the foregoing
affirn~tions

faculties?

of certituae about the various individual
It seeas to me that the obvious and logical

deduction is that Descartes was, in actual fact, and quite
consciously, certain of the aptitude for truth of his
faculties of knowledge.

And indeed, to be logical, Descartes

had to admit the validity of his powers of cognition.

For,

as we shall see, he excluded self-evident truths from his
doubt.

Now the validity of our faculties is precisely a

self-evident truth.

So, if he were consistent

ar1d

accurate,

Descartes could not, of course, entertain any doubt about
his faculties.
We come now to another and quite important group of
opinions about which Descartes never had any doubt.

First

in this group is Descartes' certitude about self-evident
truths.

Descartes asserts that even the simplest peasants

perceive these truths:
••• saepe litterati tam ingeniosi esse solent,
ut invenerint modum caecutiendi etiam in illis
quae per se evidentia sunt atque a rusticis
nunquam ignorantur ••• 44
He also tells us:
Nihilque sup~onam ex istis disciplinis, nisi
forte quaedam per se not.a et unicuique obvia ••• 45
It may be well to give here a few examples of the
self-evident truths perceived by the doubting Descartes
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himself.

Chief of his self-evident certitudes is the one

on which he builds his philosophy, the certitude of his
existence.

We have seen instances of this certitude already.

In Descartes• correspondence we find repeated affirmations
of this basic certitude.

He tells us that though we may

doubt all the things of sense, we can in no way doubt about
our own existence:
••• puis nJontrer que celuy qui doute ainsi de
tout ce qui est materiel, ne peut aucunement
pour cela douter de sa propre existence; d'o~
il suit que celuy-la, c•est A dire l'ame •••
est la premiere chose qu'on puisse connoistre
certainement ••• 46
In another letter, Descartes expresses his astonishment that anyone should consider the fact that he thinks
as on the same level with the things that we may doubt:
Pour le Docteur qui dit que nous pouuons douter
si nous pensons ou non, aussi bien que de toute
autre chose, il choque si fort la Lumiere Naturelle, que ie m•assure que personne, qu! pensera
a ce qu'il dit, ne sera de son opinion. 7
In yet another letter, Descartes affirms at some
length the impossibility of doubting the fact of thought:
Mais si l•on veut conclure son existence du sentiment ou de !'opinion qu'on a qu•on respire, en
sorte qu•encore mesme que cette opinion ne fust
pas vraye, on iuge toutesfois qu'il est impossible
qu•on l•eust, si on n•existoit, on conclud fort
bien; a cause que cette pensee ae respirer se
presente alors a nostre esprit avant celle de
notre existence, et que nous ne pouuons aouter
que nous ne ltayons pendant que nous ltauons •••
Et ce n•est autre chose a dire en ce sens-ll
~ respire, done .1& suis, sinon ~ pense, ~
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1& suis.

Et si l'on y prend garde, on trouuera
que toutes les autres propositions desquelles
nous pouuons ainsi conclure nostre existence,
reuiennent a cela mesme ••• 48

Finally, in one of his letters where he briefly sketches
the development of his philosophy, Descartes once again
asserts the certainty he possesses about the existence of
his soul.
Or je prouve aysement qu 'ils {the first p~·in
ciples of Descartes' philosophy) sont tres-clairs:
premierement, par la faqon dont je les ay trouuez,
A s~auoir en rejettant toutes les choses ausquelles je pouuois rencontrer la moindre occasion
de douter; car il est certain que celles qui n'ont
pft, en cette fagon estre rejettees, lorsqu'on
s'est applique ales considerer, sont les plus
evidentes et les plus claires que l'esprit
humain puisse coru1oistre. Ainsi, en considerant
que celui qui veut douter de tout, ne peut
toutefois douter qu'il ne soit, pendant qu'il
doute, et que ce qui raisonne ainsi, en ne
pouuant douter de soy-mesme et doutant neantmoins
de tout le reste, n'est pas ce que nous disons
estre nostre corps, mais ce que nous appellons
nostre ame ou nostre pensee, j'ai pris l'estre
ou l'existence de cette pensee pour le premier
Principe, duquel j'ai deduit tres-clairement
les suivans: l s~avoir qu'il y a un Dieu, qui
est autheur de tout ce qui est au monde, et qui,
estant la source de toute verite, n'a point cree
nostre entendement de telle nature qu'il se
puisse tremper au jugement qu'il fait des choses
dont il a une perception fort claire et fort distincte. Ce sont la tous les Principes dont je
me sers touchant les choses immaterielles ou
Metaphysiques, desquels je deduits tres-claire~
ment ceux des choses corporelles ou Physiques ••• 49
Descartes is sure,furthermore:
••• guid sit cogitatio, quid existentia, quid
certitude; item, guod fieri BQQ possit~ ut id
quod cogitet ~ existat, et talia ••• ocr--
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Emphatically, Descartes asserts the indubitability and
self-evidence of the fact of free will:
••• nihilominus enim hanc in nobis libertatem
esse experiebawur, ut possemus ab iis credendis
abstinere, quae non plane certa erant et exploaata.
Kec ulla magis per se nota et perspecta esse
possunt, quam §uae tunc temporis non dubia
videbantur ••• 1
Descartes' certitude about mathematics is, at the
most, only a shade less decided than his certitude about
self-evident truths.

A few quotations may bring this out •

••• tantummodo rectum veritatis iter quaerentes
circa nullum objectum debere occupari, de quo
non possint habere certitudinem Arithweg~cis et
Geowetricis demonstrationibus ~equalem.
Cum enim nihil in illis (Arithmetica, Geometria,
etc.) maneat occultum, et tota cognitionis
humanae capacitati aptentur ••• 53
In the passage we are about to give next, Descartes almost
appears to give the mathematicians an exclusive monopoly
on certitude:
••• il nty a eu que les seuls Mathematicians
qui ont pft trouuer quelques demonstrations,
ctest a dire §uelques raisons certaines et
evidentes ••• 4
Almost as strong are these words:
••• atqui Arithmeticam, Geometriam, aliaque
ejusmodi ••• aliquid certi atque indubitati
continere. Nam sive vigilem, sive dormiam,
duo et tria simul juncta sunt quinque, quadratumque non plura habet latera quam quattuor;
nee fieri posse videtur ut tam perspicuae verita.tes in suspicionem falsitatis incurrant.55
Then there is Descartes' certitude about faith and
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morals.

His words about these matters are quite

unequivoc~l.

There are many passages like the following, in,which
Descartes calls our certitude about faith the strongest of
all certitudes:
••• quod tamen non impedit quominus illa, quae
divinitus revelata sunt, omni cognitione certiora
credamus ••• 56
Another familiar thought of Descartes concerning revealed
truth is this one, in which he plainly removes revelation
from the touch of his doubt:
••• a~rant apr is • • • que les veri tez revelees,
qui y (to heaven) conduisent, sont au dessus
de nostre intelligence, ie n•eusse ose les souwettre a la foiblesse de mes raisonnenJens ••• 57
This same thought recurs a few pages later on, where Descartes' well

kno~n

maxims of morality are put in the same

class with revelation:
Apres m•estre ainsi assure de ces maximes, et
les avoir mises a part, avec les veritez de la
foy, qui ont tousiours este les premieres en ma.
creance, ie iugay que, pour tout le reste de rues
opinions, ie gguuois librement entreprendre de
m'en defaire.
In this same passage Descartes tells us of at least
four concrete truths which he has no intention to rid himself of, or in other words, which he does not mean to doubt.
These four truths are his four maxims of morality, which
we enumerate here:
La premiere estoit d'obeir aux lois et aux cous-

tumes de mon pa1s, retenant constanment la
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religion en laquelle Dieu m•a fait la grace
dtestre instruit des mon enfance, et me gouvernant,
en toute autre chose, suiuant les opinions les
plus moderees, et les plus esloignees de l'exces,
qui fussent communement receUes en pratique par
les mieux sensez de ceux avec lesquels i'aurois
a viure.
seconde maxime estoit d'estre le plus ferme
et le plus resolu en mes actions que ie pourrois,
et de ne suiure pas moins- constanment les opinions
les plus douteuses, lorsque ie m'y serois une
fois determine, que si elles eussent este tres
assurees.
Ma

Ma troisieme maxime estoit de tascher tousiours
plutost a me vaincre que la fortune, et a changer
mes desirs que l'ordre du monde; et generalement,
de m'accoustumer a croire qu'il n'y a rien qui
soit entierement en nostre pouuoir, que nos
pensees, en sorte qu'apres que nous auons fait
nostre mieux, toucrumt les choses qui nous sont
exterieures, tout ce qui manque de nous reussir
est, au regard de nous, absolument impossible.

Enfin, pour conclusion de cette Morale, ie mtauisay
de faire une reueu~ sur les diverse occupations
qu'ont les hommes en cete vie, pour tascher a
faire chois de la meilleure; et sans que ie vueille
rien dire de celles des autres, ie pensay que ie
ne pouuois mieux que de continu~r en celle la
·mesme ou ie me trouuois, c•est a dire, que dtemployer toute ma vie a cultiver ma raison, et
m•auancer, autant que ie pourrois, en la connoissance de la verite.t suiuant la Methode que ie
m'estois prescrite.o9
In these four maxims of morality we have at least four
definite truthb which Descartes explicitly withholds from
his doubt.
Less important explicit certitudes, but still deserving mention, are those Descartes had concerning the efficacy of the method of Doubt and the futility of Dialectics.
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In the same breath in which he bids his reader to doubt,
he claims that he has proven to the reader with certitude,
therefore indubitably, the fruitfulness of the method he
proposes:

Ex quibus omnibus colligitur primo, distincte •••
nos exposuisse ~·· nullas vias hominibus patere
ad cognitionem certam veritatis, praeter evidentem intuitum, et necessariam deductionem;
item etiaw, quid sint naturae illae simplices ••• 60
Of course, Descartes himself was certain of the value of
his method.

Thus, in the Discours, he tells us that as

he was about to put his method into practice,
••• par elle, i'estois assure dtuser en tout
de ma r.aison, sinon parf-aitement, au moins le
mieux qui fust en mon pouuoir.61
Complementary to his confidence in his own method, is
his certainty about the futility of Dialectics:
Atqui ut adhuc evidentius appareat, illam
disserendi artem nihil ow1ino conferre ad
cognitionem veritatis ••• 62
We shall conclude this section on the exJ?licit certitudes that surround Descartes' doubt with several other
examples.

In the Discours Descartes assures us that at

the time when he was thinking of adopting his method of
doubt,
Ie sc;avois que les langues qu•on y apprent, sont
necessaires pour l'intelligence des livres
anciens; que la gentillesse des fables resueille
l'esprit; que les actions lliemorables des histoires
le releuent, et qu'estant leues avec d.iscretion,
elles aydent .~ former le iugement; que la lecture
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des bons liures est comme une conuersation auec
les plus honnestes gens des siecles passez •••
et mesme une conuersation estudiee, en laquelle
1ls ne nous decouurent que les meilleures de
leurs pensees; que l'Elo~uence a des forces et
des beautez incoruparables; que la Po~sie a des
delicatesses et des douceurs tres rauissantes •••
que la Iurisprudence, la Medecine et les autres
sciences apportent des honne'!trs et des richesses
a ceux qui les cultiuent ••• o3
In a similar strain, Descartes expresses his certain views
on the nature of Poetry and Rhetoric, and on the involved
nature of Philosophy.64
these things?

How could Descartes doubt ,any of

Were they not made clear to him by his own

certain intuitions or deductions?
It is well to pause for a moment and look at the consistency, or lack of it, in Descartes' stand.

Even as he

bade us to doubt, we have seen him expressing his certitude about the existence of knowledge, about the trustworthiness of the faculties of Knowledge, about the excellence of his method, about the nature of the various
subjects studied in school.

On the other hand, he seems

to have considered his doubt universal (cf. Ch. 3), in the
sense in which we speak today of a universal doubt as an
attempted solution of the critical problem.

In the one

case, he holds a non-universal, in the otner, a universal
doubt.

Manifestly, such a position is illogical and

inconsistent; but it seems to have been the position of
Descartes: at times he called his doubt universal; at other
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times, he was equally clear, i:f not more so, in considerably
restricting its scope.
DESCARTES'

With these remarks we may close the consi-

Il~iPLICIT

CERTITUDES

deration of those certitudes which Descartes

held or affirmed more or less explicitly.

Mingled with

these "explicit" certitudes, are :found wany implicit certitudes.

Some of these are too important to pass over with-

out mention.

In the next section, therefore, we shall exa-

mine a few of the more important of these implicit certitudes.
As our first instanc•, we may t.ake this passage :from
the Regglae:
Expositis duabus intellectus nostri operationibus, intuitu et deductione, quibus solis
ad scientias autiiscendas utendum esse diximus ••• 65
Even a cursory examination of this sentence will reveal a
host of implicit certitudes:

Descartes is cert.ain that

he has a personality, that he has been writing, that his
writing took some time, that there is such a thing as time,
that he is now in the present, that he has more than two
faculties, that the understanding seeks truth, that he has
a mind, etc., etc.

In like manner one could. take every

page of Descartes' writings concerning his doubt, and one
would discover on each page innumerable implied certitudes
such as those we have just seen.
It should be remarked here, that implicit certitudes
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of the type just enumerated do not express Descartes' own
attitude towards certitude.

On the contrary, he objectively

denied such implicit certitudes, that is, he considered
himself as doubting them; but logically, he necessarily
implied these certitudes.

In the light of this fact, such

implicit certitudes merely show concretely the psychological impossibility of a universal doubt.

Descartes tried

to convince himself that he doubted things about which he
really possessed certitude.

Again, an illogical position.

Also calling for a word or two of comment are Descartes' implicit statements of certitude about the efficacy
of his method, about knowledge, about the aptitude of the
wind, and about the impossibility of doubting what is
self-evident.

We have already seen Descartes explicitly

affirm his belief in his method.
tude implied in his works.

We find the same certi-

He is sure, for example, of

the usefulness of the directions he gives:
Sed insuper advertendum est, n~ximam &~jus regulae utilitatem in eo consistere •••
The statement of Rule XI also implies the same certitude:
Regula XI: Postquaw aliquot propositiones simplices sumus intuiti, si ex illis aliquid .aliud
concluda.mus, utile est easciem continuo et
nullibi interrupto cogitationis motu percurrere,
ad lliutuos illorum respectus reflectere, et plura
simul, quantum fieri potest, distincte concipere:
ita enim et cognitio nostra longe certior fit,
et maxime augetur ingenii capacitas.67
Similarly, the existence of knowledge, affirmed by

..
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Descartes more or less explicitly, as we have seen, is
constantly implied by him, as, e.g., in this passage:
••• quisque firmiter sibi persuadeat, non ex
magnis et obscuris rebus, sed facilibus tantum
et magis obviis, scientias quantumlibet occultas
esse deducendas.68
or in this one:
••• hoc in loco, ubi qua ratione aptiores reddamur ad veritates unas ab allis deducendas,
inquirimus ••• 69
The aptitude of the mind, a certitude likewise explicitly stated, is also implied in various places; for instance,
in these lines of the Meditationes:
••• ex quo de omnibus volui dubitare, nihil
adhuc praeter me et Deum existere certo cognevi ••• 70
Nor is it difficult to read the implications of the mind's
aptitude found in the following words:
••• operae pretium esse dicimus, illa omnia,
quae in propositione data sunt, ordine perlustrare, rejiciendo illa, guae ad rem non
facere aperte videbimus ••• 71
It appears that the mind is capable of recognizing what
"order" is, what "data" are, what a "proposition" is,
what "everything" is, what is "immaterial."

Other si-

milar implications of the validity of our cognitive faculty
are scattered everywhere in Descartes' methodological
works; so Descartes "did not in practice doubt the ability of his reason to arrive at truth and certainty ••• n72
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No; nor, it appears, did he doubt this in theory, either,
at least at times.

***
In the preceding section we have examined some of
the more important explicit and implicit certitudes that
were present in the mind of the doubting Descartes.

We

have seen that Descartes' explanations of his own doubt
contain countless certitudes.

It is rather important to

note here that these certitudes were, in almost every case,
of a speculative order: their objects were, for example,
the existence of truth, certituae, science; the aptitude
for truth;of our individual faculties; the efficacy of
Descartes' method of doubt; the futility of Dialectics; the
certitude of

s~lf-evident

and of indubitable truths.

This

point should be borne in mind when we come to say a word
or two about the metaphysical nature of Descartes' doubt.
EXTENSION
OF DOUBT

Descartes, then, had, even at the very time
of his doubt, many, many certitudes.

But if so

many things were, at least at times, consciously excluded
by him from his doubt, we may ask wt.I.B.t, in Descartes' mind,
did the doubt include?

Descartes certainly meant it to

take in doubtful things, those things "in quibus vel miniroam incertitudinis suspicionem reperiemus.n73

And among

these dubitable things, it seems that he included, at least
later on, Mathematics.

For in the Principia, Descartes
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tells us that having now freed ourselves of our supreme
doubt,
Non enim awplius :Ma.thema.ticae veritates nobis
suspectae esse debent, quia sunt maxime perspicuae.74
In the Meditationes, (AT, 7.70), Descartes likewise tells
us that whereas in his su¥reme doubt he doubted the truths
of Geon1etry and the like, ttafter I have recognized that
there is a God,tt these truths are beyond doubt.
Besides "dubitable" things, and Mathematics, Geometry,
and the like, it seems that Descartes also extended his
doubt to the existence of his mind and body.

This is in-

dicated by these words:
••• statim post ••• non amplius dubitare potui
quin mens existeret; ut etiam post sextam
Meditationem, in qua corporis existentiam cognovi, non amplius de ipsa potui dubitare.75
Lastly, Descartes, as we have seen, evidently meant his
doubt to take in all sense knowledge (cf. AT, 10.514).
CONCLUSION

By way of a final note to these argullients

for and against the universality of

Desc~rtes'

uoubt, we

should like to remark the quite obvious fact that there
is a case for both sides of this question.

At one time

Descartes seems to hold a universal doubt; at another
time, his doubt appears to be very restricted in scope.
To us it seems that Descartes tried hard to hold on to a
universal doubt, but found this impossible.

Consequently,

------
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he vacillated back and forth between a universal
non-universal doubt.
inconsistent.

~nd

a

In a word, he was illogical ar1d
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CHAPTER V.
OTHER ASPECTS OF DESCARTES' DOUBT.
FICTITIOUS
DOUBT?

Having exanJined the problem of its uni versality, we may now briefly inquire into the real-

ity of Descartes' doubt.

First, let us examine the evidence

for the fictitiousness of the doubt.

About the strongest

argument is this statement in the Meditationes:
••• revera esse aliqueru mundum, et horuines
habere corpora, et similia, de quibus nemo
umquam sanae mentis serio dubitavit ••• 1
Yet, as we have seen (cf. supra, p. 43), Descartes has
put these things within the pale of his doubt.
suggest that Descartes' doubt was feigned.

This might

In the Objec-

tiones £Ym Responsionibus we do find this view of Descartes' doubtt
Quicquid dixeris, nemo erit, qui persuadeatur
te esse persua.suru, nihil esse verum ex iis
omnibus quae cognoveris ••• 2
These are the strongest texts we have found for the unreality of Descartes' doubt.
REAL

DOUBT?

Much more nuwerous are the indications that
Descartes' doubt was a real doubt.

First, there

is Descartes' own testimony regaraing this ruatter.

Surely

he cannot be speaking of a feigned doubt in this passage:
••• sed tandem cogor fateri nihil esse ex iis
quae olim vera putabam, de quo non liceat dubitare, idque non per inconsiderantiam vel levitatem, sed propter validas et meditatas rationes;
ideoque etiam ab iisdem, non minus quam ab aperte
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falsis, accurate deinceps assensionem ess3
cohibendam, si quid certi velim invenire.
And one can see a real doubt in the attitude expressed by
this sentence:
••• ibi tantum agebatur de summa illa dubitatione, quam saepe metaphysicam, hyperbolicam,
atque ad usuw vitae nullo modo transferendaw
esse inculcavi ••• 4
Vfuat Descartes says is quite true: he insisted on his doubt
at great length.

Again and again he writes of it, and

tries -- not with much success -- to define its nature.
Throughout his works he is defending the legality ana validity of this doubt.

Now surely, this ceaseless explain-

ing, this repeated defending of his doubt is a strong indication that the doubt was a real d.oubt.

For had it been

merely fictitious, Descartes could have, almost certainly
would have,stated this fact in a simple, single bald sentence; and there would have been no need for him to devote
so many and such cautiously worded pages to the exposition
and defence of his doubt.
Speaking of his doubt often and at no little length,
most of the time Descartes testifies to its realness.

He

tells us, for example, that
••• etiamsi praeceptores mei nihil me certi
edocuerint ••• gratias ipsis habere debeo, easque nunc profecto temporis, quoniam omne id
quod me docuerunt adeo dubium fuit, majores,
quam si magis rationi consentaneum fuisset ••• 5
We might quote other passages {e.g., AT, 7.263,264;
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6.33) which point to a real doubt.
selves with just two more.

We shall content our-

The serious tone of the words

that follow can stand only for a very real doubt:
Animadvert! ••• omnia semel in vita esse evertenda, atque a primis fundrunentis denuo incho. andum ••• opportune igitur hodie ••• serio tandem et libere generali huic mearum opinionum
eversion! vacabo.6
Finally, in one of his letters Descartes tells us indirectly that his doubt was real.

He compares his doubt

to the doubt of the sceptics, which is a real doubt.

In

thus placing his doubt in the same category with the doubt
of the Pyrrhonic school, Descartes lets us know that he
considered his own doubt as real as the doubt of the sceptics:
Bien que les Pyrrhoniens n•ayent rien conclu de
certain en suite d.e leurs doutes, ce n•est pas
a dire qu'on ne le puisse. Et ie tascherois ici
de faire voir comment on sten p~ut seruir pour
prouuer l•existence de Dieu •••
So far we have seen the
to the reality of his

Ph~osopher

doubt.~

1

s

own

te~timony

Most present day writers on

Descartes that we have examined seem not to touch this
aspect of the doubt at all.
real doubt.

Those that do are all for a

M. Verneaux is especially clear upon this

matter:
••• si le doute a pour fonction de combattre une
habitude inveteree (the habit of relying on the
senses), 11 s•ensuit qu'il est une demarche volontaire et psychologiquement reelle ••• Le temps
donne ala premi~re Meditation ••• tmanebo obstinate in hac meditatione defixus' (AT, 7.23);

r
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ce qui ne se comprend que si le doute doit reelles'imposer A l'esprit, "balancern les anciens
prejuges (ib., 7.22) et desaccoutumer d'y donner
creance.
Il n•y a done pas lieu, selon nous, d'opposer son
methodique et son caract~re reelle •••
Le Discours, destine au grand public, peut bien
en quelques endroits laisser entendre que Descartes se contente d'ur! doute fictif, mais l'ensemble des explications donnees coupe court l
cette alternative ••• 8
caract~re

Father Mahony very plainly asserts the reality of the
doubt:
All his previous knowledge, he ••• doubted,
not merely by a negative, but b,y a real, positive doubt ••• 9
One more indication of the reality of the doubt may
be given.

As every one knows, Descartes was very careful

to form for himself a provisional code of morals:
••• affin que ie ne demeurasse point irresolu
en mes actions, pendant que la raison mtobligeroit de l'estre en mes iugemens • . ie me
formay une morale par prouision ••• 10
If Descartes' doubt had been fictitious, what need had he
to draw up rules of conduct?

Besides, when a man indulges

in a fictitious doubt, he can scarcely be said "to be
irresolute in his judgments!"
Since it would seem that Descartes' doubt was a real
doubt, it, of course, follows that he should have excluded
from it all self-evident truths, -- consequently the aptitude for truth of the mind and of our faculties of knowing:
of the senses, of our reasoning power, our immediate
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analytic judgments, our consciousness.
In the case of a real doubt, Descartes should also
have refrained from ever including in it all those countless derived certitudes for which he possessed objective
evidence.

Such derived certitudes he did

r~ve

about the

usefulness of a classical education, for instru1ce, or about
the existence of certitude in others, or about mathematics,
geometry, and like subjects.

If Descartes did at any time

include any such self-evident or derived certitudes in his
doubt, as he seems to have done, his "real" doubt in regard to these things was no more than illusory.

For one

cannot really doubt that which one sees to be so.

***
METAPHYSICAL
DOUBT

We have shown that very probably Descartes'
doubt was not universal, and that it seems

to have been real.
nature.

It remains to

ex~lain

its metaphysical

Descartes himself affirms this quality of the

doubt:
••• clare patet, me ibi tantum loquutum esse
de morali sciendi modo, qui sufficit ad vitam
regendam, et quem a Metaphysico illo, de quo
hie questio est, plurimuw differre saepe
inculcavi ••• 11
••• studiose omnia quae ad pietatem, ac generaliter ad mores spectant, ab hac abdicatione,
exceperim ••• 12
M. Verneaux throws considerable light on the meaning of
this adjective "metaphysical," as Descartes uses it of his
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doubt:
••• le doute est souvent nomme par Descartes •••
un doute meta~hysique. D'abord, parce que
crest une demarche complexe, inaccoutumee, et
fort eloignee du sens comwun. Ensuite, parce
qu'il ne doit pas ~tre transporte dans la vie
pratique, wais strictement cantone dans la sp~
culation. Mais m~taphysique surtout, parce
qu'il est le fondement de la metaphysique
comme science apodictique.l3
This third meaning of metaphysical is further distinguished
in a two-fold manner:
tant m~me que "metaphysique," il a une double
fonction: l'une,generale, concerne la certitude
des principes et des facult~s de connaissance;
l•autre,speciale, concerne l•existence d'un ~tre
pouvant servir de principe .h. la connaissance du
reel ••• Methode pour assurer les fondements de
notre connaissance du vrai et de notre connaissance
de l'existence, le doute est egalement aans les
deux cas m~t.aphysique .14
En

To tell the truth, although Descartes claims that he
has spoken at great length of his metaphysical doubt, he
never clearly tells us just what he himself understands by
a metaphysical doubt.

From his use of the term, i t seexns

that he mistakenly believed tnere was but one true kind
of certitude, absolute or metaphysical certitude (cf.
Chapter
1).
.......

This, of course, is untrue.

HYpothetical

certitude is as truly certitude as absolute certitude.
Psychologically there is little difference between the two.
From this it follows that if I am morally certain of
son1ething, I cannot doubt that thing, not even with a
metaphysical doubt, whatever that term may be taken to
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mean.

At the most, I can ex&nine that moral certitude, to

see whether it may not indeed be a metaphysical certitude.
To do this, however, is not to doubt the fact which forms
the content of my moral certitude; it is at most to
doubt whether the moral certitude may not be metaphysical.
If, then, by metaphysical doubt Descartes understood an
actual doubt concerning the contents of his moral certitudes,
he was illogical.

One cannot doubt that of which one is

certain, though that certitude be merely moral.
it seems, was guilty

o~

precisely this error.

Descartes,
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CONCLUSION.
In our Introduction we hinted at the obscurity which
surrounds Descartes' doubt.

The

exten~ion

and nature of

this doubt is one of Descartes' contradictory ambiguities
ambiguities he makes no clean-cut effort to reconcile.
By way of conclusion, we should like briefly to sum
up the evidence on each side of the question this thesis
set out to answer: Was Descartes' doubt universal?
We found many statements in Descartes himself which
seemed to indicate a universal doubt.
us (cf. p. 17,

su,t.~ra)

Descartes tells

that he wished "to examine all his

opinions;" for, he says, we

:a~y

doubt about "all things."

Certainly he seems to have doubted at least all the knowledge that came to him through his senses.

However, as

far as sense knowledge is concerned, we saw that Descartes'
doubt could at most have been but illusory.

Such was

Descartes' own testimony for a universal doubt.
As for the testimony of others, we saw that M. Verneaux and Mr. Sewall held the universality of the doubt.
Finally, we ventured the opinion that Descartes'
"universal" doubt, in so far as it was "universal" was not
a doubt, but an "abstraction."
import of the well known

exa~ple

This seemed to be the
of the barrel and apples.

Numerous as were the statements favouring a universal
doubt, those indicating a non-universal doubt were far

-
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more numerous.

To begin with, we heard Descartes denying

the possibility or a universal doubt.

We heard him say

that he aimed to reject only dubitable, uncertain, unreasoned opinions.

When he spoke of doubting "all things,"

Descartes sometimes quite apparently meant only "all dubitable things.''

But in this he was illogical; for it was

impossible to doubt some of the things he considered "dubitable."
We saw, further, that M. Chevalier, and Mr. Keeling,
both considered Descartes' doubt as non-universal.
Such was the general testimony backing the non-universality of the doubt.

The particular evidence also sup-

porting this view was very copious.

First there were the

many explicit certitudes accompanying Descartes' explanations of his doubt.

Chief or these certitudes were those

concerning non-existing things and mathematics.

Then there

were the certitudes dealing with certitude itself, and
with the existence of truth and falsity.

Moreover, we

found Descartes to be sure of the existence or four faculties of knowledge, and of the trustworthiness of these
faculties.

Besides this, Descartes doubted neither self-

evident judgments nor ideas.

He was certain of the apti-

tude of his cognitive faculties to attain truth.

And we

must not omit to mention the capital certitude on which
Descartes built his philosophy, the certitude of his own
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existence.

Indeed, that truth was the "limit to his doubt."

Then there were the important certitudes dealing with faith
and with n1orality.

Likewise worthy of mention, are the

certitudes concerning the efficacy of his method and the
futility of dialectics.

Last among the explicit certitudes

were those concerning the study of Language, of Poetry,
Rhetoric, Medicine, etc.
Mingled with these explicit certitudes we also discovered countless implicit certitudes.

We found Descartes

not merely explicitly, but also implicitly certain of the
efficacy of his method, of the existence of knowledge, of
the aptitude of the mind, of the indubitability of selfevident truths.
Such is the evidence for and against the universality
of the doubt.

The reader is free to embrace whatever side

of the question he prefers.

To us it seems that the hodge-

podge of doubts and certitudes which we have examined shows
Descartes' inconsistency and lack of logic.

He wanted

"to doubt all;" he tried to persuade himself he did and
built his system as if he did -- but found

h~

could not.

As a result, his writings show illogicality, strife, vacillation.

At times he calls his doubt universal; at

other times, and far more frequently, he tells us that
it is not universal.

-
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